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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-790
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JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., PETI-
TIONERS v. ZIYA K. KORAY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the third circuit
[June 5, 1995]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  Title 18 U. S. C. 3585(b) provides that a defendant
generally must -be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in
official detention prior to the date the sentence com-
mences.-  Before the commencement of respondent's
federal sentence, a federal magistrate judge -released-
him on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984
and ordered him confined to a community treatment
center.  The question presented is whether respondent
was in -official detention,- and thus entitled to a
sentence credit under 3585(b), during the time he spent
at the treatment center.  We hold that he was not.
  On April 23, 1991, respondent Ziya Koray was arrested
for laundering monetary instruments in violation of 18
U. S. C. 1956(a)(1).  On June 18, 1991, he pleaded
guilty to that charge in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland.  One week later, on June
25, 1991, a federal magistrate judge entered a -release
order- pursuant to 18 U. S. C. 3142(c), ordering
respondent released on bail, pending sentencing, into the
custody of the Pretrial Services Agency.  The order
required that he be -confined to [the] premises- of a
Volunteers of America community treatment center
without -authoriz[ation] to leave for any reason unless
accompanied- by a Government special agent.  On
October 22, 1991, the District Court sentenced respond-
ent to 41 months' imprisonment.  Respondent remained
at the Volunteers of America facility until November 25,
1991, the day he reported to the Allenwood Federal
Prison Camp to serve his sentence.
  Respondent requested the Bureau of Prisons (BOP or
Bureau) to credit toward his sentence of imprisonment
the approximately 150 days he spent at the Volunteers
of America community treatment center between June
25 and November 25, 1991.  Relying on its established
policy, BOP refused to grant the requested credit.  After
exhausting his administrative remedies, respondent filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
seeking credit under 18 U. S. C. 3585 for the time he
spent at the community treatment center.  The District
Court denied the petition, finding that respondent's stay
at the center did not constitute -official detention-
within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. 3585(b).
  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
21 F. 3d 558 (1994).  It acknowledged that the over-
whelming majority of the Courts of Appeals -have
concluded that section 3585 . . . does not require the
Bureau to credit presentenced defendants whose bail
conditions allowed them to be confined outside of Bureau
of Prison[s] facilities.-  Id., at 561.  The Court declined,
however, to defer to the Bureau's view-that time spent
under highly restrictive conditions while -released- on
bail is not -`official detention'- under 3585(b) because
a -`released'- defendant is not subject to the Bureau's
control.  21 F. 3d, at 562-565.  Instead, the Court
reasoned that 3585(b)'s -`official detention'- language
need not be read -as if it provided `official detention by
the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons,'- since
-there is nothing in the statute which requires or
suggests that a defendant must be under the detention
of the Bureau,- and since -[a] court may `detain' a
person as `official[ly]' as the Attorney General.-  21 F.
3d, at 563-564.  Concluding that -`official detention' for
purposes of credit under 18 U. S. C. 3585 includes time
spent under conditions of jail-type confinement,- 21 F.
3d, at 567, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for
a determination whether respondent was in -jail-type
confinement- during his stay at the Volunteers of
America community treatment center.
  We granted the Government's petition for certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the
question whether a federal prisoner is entitled to credit
against his sentence under 3585(b) for time when he
was -released- on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act
of 1984.  513 U. S. ___ (1995).  We now reverse.
  Title 18 U. S. C. 3585 determines when a federal
sentence of imprisonment commences and whether credit
against that sentence must be granted for time spent in
-official detention- before the sentence began.  It states:
-Calculation of a term of imprisonment
      -(a) Commencement of sentence.--A sentence to a
term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody awaiting transporta-
tion to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of
sentence at, the official detention facility at which
the sentence is to be served.
      -(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant shall be
given credit toward the service of a term of impris-
onment for any time he has spent in official deten-
tion prior to the date the sentence commences-
        -(1) as a result of the offense for which the
      sentence was imposed; or
        -(2) as a result of any other charge for which
      the defendant was arrested after the commission
      of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
-that has not been credited against another sen-
tence.-  18 U. S. C. 3585 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S. 329, 337 (1992),
we specifically noted Congress' use of the term -`official
detention'- in 3585(b), but we had no occasion to rule
on the meaning of that term.  We must do so today.
  The Government contends that the phrase -official
detention- in 3585(b) refers to a court order detaining
a defendant and committing him to the custody of the
Attorney General for confinement.  Respondent, on the
other hand, argues that the phrase -official detention-
includes the restrictive conditions of his release on bail
because the federal magistrate's bail order was -official-
and significantly curtailed his liberty.  Viewing the
phrase in isolation, it may be said that either reading is
plausible.  But it is a -fundamental principle of statu-
tory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that
the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isola-
tion, but must be drawn from the context in which it is
used.-  Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. ___, ___ (1993)
(slip op., at 3).  After examining the phrase -official
detention- in this light, we believe the Government's
interpretation is the correct one.
  Section 3585(b) provides credit for time -spent in offi-
cial detention prior to the date the sentence commences,-
18 U. S. C. 3585(b) (emphasis added), thus making
clear that credit is awarded only for presentence re-
straints on liberty.  Because the Bail Reform Act of
1984, 18 U. S. C. 3141 et seq., is the body of law that
authorizes federal courts to place presentence restraints
on a defendant's liberty, see 3142(a) (authorizing courts
to impose restraints on the defendant -pending trial-);
3143(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints while
the defendant -is awaiting imposition or execution of
sentence-), the -official detention- language of 3585(b)
must be construed in conjunction with that Act.  This is
especially so because the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was
enacted in the same statute as the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, of which 3585 is a part.  See Gozlon-
Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 407-408 (1991)
(-It is not uncommon to refer to other, related legislative
enactments when interpreting specialized statutory
terms,- since Congress is presumed to have -legislated
with reference to- those terms).
  The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court
with two choices when dealing with a criminal defendant
who has been -charged with an offense- and is awaiting
trial, 18 U. S. C. 3142(a), or who -has been found
guilty of an offense and . . . is awaiting imposition or
execution of sentence,- 3143(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp V).
The court may either (1) -release- the defendant on bail
or (2) order him -detained- without bail.  A court may
-release- a defendant subject to a variety of restrictive
conditions, including residence in a community treatment
center.  See 3142(c)(1)(B)(i), (x) and (xiv).  If, however,
the court -finds that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person
and the community,- 3142(e), the court -shall order the
detention of the person,- ibid., by issuing a -detention
order- -direct[ing] that the person be committed to the
custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a
corrections facility.-  3142(i)(2).  Thus, under the
language of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant
suffers -detention- only when committed to the custody
of the Attorney General; a defendant admitted to bail on
restrictive conditions, like respondent was, is -released.-
See Dawson v. Scott, No. 93-6240, 1995 WL 148978,
*4-5, and nn. 11-12 (CA11, Apr. 6, 1995); Moreland v.
United States, 968 F. 2d 655, 659-660 (CA8), cert.
denied, 506 U. S. ___ (1992); id., at 661-663 (Loken, J.,
concurring); United States v. Becak, 954 F. 2d 386, 388
(CA6), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 945 (1992).
  Section 3585(a) and related sentencing provisions
confirm this interpretation.  Section 3585(a) provides
that a federal sentence -commences- when the defendant
is received for transportation to or arrives at -the official
detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.-
Title 18 U. S. C. 3621, in turn, provides that the
sentenced defendant -shall be committed to the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons,- 3621(a), which -may desig-
nate any available penal or correctional facility . . . ,
whether maintained by the Federal Government or
otherwise . . . , that the Bureau determines to be
appropriate and suitable.-  3621(b) (emphasis added).
The phrase -official detention facility- in 3585(a)
therefore must refer to a correctional facility designated
by the Bureau for the service of federal sentences, where
the Bureau retains the discretion to -direct the transfer
of a prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to
another.-  3621(b).
  This reading of 3585(a) is reinforced by other provi-
sions governing the administration of federal sentences.
For example, 3622 gives the Bureau authority to
release a prisoner from the place of his imprisonment
for a limited period to -participate in a training or
educational program in the community while continuing
in official detention at the prison facility,- 3622(b), or
to -work at paid employment in the community while
continuing in official detention at the penal or correc-
tional facility.-  3622(c).  Because the words -official
detention- should bear the same meaning in subsections
(a) and (b) of 3585 as they do in the above related
sentencing statutes, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U. S. ____, ____ (1992) (slip op., at 9)
(-the basic canon of statutory construction [is] that
identical terms within an Act bear the same meaning-),
credit for time spent in -official detention- under
3585(b) is available only to those defendants who were
detained in a -penal or correctional facility,- 3621(b),
and who were subject to BOP's control.
  The context and history of 3585(b) also support this
view.  As for context, 3585(b) reduces a defendant's
-imprisonment- by the amount of time spent in -official
detention- before his sentence, strongly suggesting that
the period of presentence -detention- must be equivalent
to the -imprisonment- itself.  It would be anomalous to
interpret 3585(b) to require sentence credit for time
spent confined in a community treatment center where
the defendant is not subject to BOP's control, since
Congress generally views such a restriction on liberty as
part of a sentence of -probation,- see 18 U. S. C.
3563(b)(10), (12), and (14), or -supervised release,- see
3583(d), rather than part of a sentence of -imprison-
ment.-  See United States v. Zackular, 945 F. 2d 423,
425 (CA1 1991).
  With respect to history, 3585(b)'s predecessor, 18
U. S. C. 3568, required the Attorney General to award
sentence credit for -any days spent in custody in
connection with the offense or acts for which sentence
was imposed.-  18 U. S. C. 3568 (1982 ed.) (emphasis
added) (repealed).  The Courts of Appeals uniformly held
that the phrase -in custody- did not allow sentence
credit because of restrictions placed on a defendant's
liberty as a condition of release on bail.  See Polakoff v.
United States, 489 F. 2d 727, 730 (CA5 1974) (time
spent on -highly restricted bond- not creditable as
-`custody'-); United States v. Robles, 563 F. 2d 1308,
1309 (CA9 1977) (-time spent on bail or on bond
pending appeal is not time served `in custody'-), cert.
denied, 435 U. S. 925 (1978); Ortega v. United States,
510 F. 2d 412, 413 (CA10 1975) (-`custody'- refers to
-actual custodial incarceration,- not -the time a criminal
defendant is free on bond-); United States v. Peterson,
507 F. 2d 1191, 1192 (CADC 1974) (-`in custody'- does
-not refer to the stipulations imposed when a defendant
is at large on conditional release-).  In 1984, Congress
enacted 3585(b) and altered 3568 by, inter alia,
-replac[ing] the term `custody' with the term `official
detention.'-  Wilson, 503 U. S., at 337; see also 18
U. S. C. 3585(b).  In thus rewording the credit statute,
however, nothing suggests that Congress disagreed with
the Courts of Appeals' rule denying credit to defendants
who had been released on bail.  To the contrary,
Congress presumably made the change to conform the
credit statute to the nomenclature used in related
sentencing provisions, see 18 U. S. C. 3585(a)
and 3622, and in the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
See Moreland, supra, at 662, and n. 5 (Loken, J.,
concurring).
  The Bureau, as the agency charged with administering
the credit statute, see Wilson, supra, at 334-335,
likewise has interpreted 3585(b)'s -official detention-
language to require credit for time spent by a defendant
under a 3142(e) -detention order,- but not for time
spent under a 3142(c) -release order,- no matter how
restrictive the conditions.  As we have explained, see
supra, at 5-9, the Bureau's interpretation is the most
natural and reasonable reading of 3585(b)'s -offi-
cial detention- language.  It is true that the Bu-
reau's interpretation appears only in a -Program
Statement--an internal agency guideline-rather than
in -published regulations subject to the rigors of the
Administrative Procedur[e] Act, including public notice
and comment.-  21 F. 3d, at 562.  But BOP's internal
agency guideline, which is akin to an -interpretive rule-
that -do[es] not require notice-and-comment,- Shalala v.
Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. ___, ___ (1995)
(slip op., at 11), is still entitled to some deference, cf.
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991), since it is a -permis-
sible construction of the statute.-  Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S.
837, 843 (1984).
  Respondent, as we have indicated, disagrees with the
above interpretation of 3585(b).  He contends that the
-plain meaning- of the phrase -official detention-
includes the restrictive conditions of his confinement,
even though he was released on bail.  This contention is
a plausible one if the phrase is read in isolation:
respondent was subjected to restrictive conditions when
released on bail, these conditions were imposed by a
court order, and his sojourn in the community treatment
center therefore amounted to -official detention.-  But
even without reference to the context of the language
and the history of the statute, respondent's is not the
only plausible interpretation of the language; it would be
too much to say that the statute -cannot bear the
interpretation adopted by- the Bureau.  Sullivan v.
Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 91-92 (1990).  And in light of
the foregoing textual and historical analysis, the initial
plausibility of respondent's reading simply does not carry
the day.
  Respondent also argues it is improper to focus on the
release/detention dichotomy of the Bail Reform Act of
1984 to construe 3585(b)'s -official detention- language
because a defendant -released- on bail may be subjected
to conditions (under 18 U. S. C. 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv)) that
are just as onerous as those faced by -detained- defend-
ants.  In addition, he asserts that his confinement as
a -released- defendant in the Volunteers of America
community treatment center constituted -official deten-
tion- because -sentenced- prisoners are deemed to be in
-official detention- when BOP authorizes them to serve
the last part of their sentences in a community treat-
ment center, see U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of
Prisons Program Statement No. 7310.02 (Oct. 19, 1993)
(interpreting 18 U. S. C. 3624(c) to allow BOP to place
sentenced prisoners in community corrections centers,
since such centers meet 18 U. S. C. 3621(b)'s definition
of a -penal or correctional facility-), or to serve their
sentences on educational or work release, see 18
U. S. C. 3622(b) and (c).
  It is quite true that under the Government's theory a
defendant -released- to a community treatment center
could be subject to restraints which do not materially
differ from those imposed on a -detained- defendant
committed to the custody of the Attorney General, and
thence assigned to a treatment center.  But this fact
does not undercut the remaining distinction which exists
between all defendants committed to the custody of the
Attorney General on the one hand, and all defendants
released on bail on the other.  Unlike defendants
-released- on bail, defendants who are -detained- or
-sentenced- always remain subject to the control of the
Bureau.  See Randall v. Whelan, 938 F. 2d 522, 525
(CA4 1991).  This is an important distinction, as the
identity of the custodian has both legal and practical
significance.  A defendant who is -released- is not in
BOP's custody, and he cannot be summarily reassigned
to a different place of confinement unless a judicial
officer revokes his release, see 18 U. S. C. 3148(b), or
modifies the conditions of his release, see 3142(c)(3).
A defendant who is -detained,- however, is completely
subject to BOP's control.  And -[t]hat single factor
encompasses a wide variety of restrictions.-  Randall,
supra, at 525.  -Detained- defendants are subject to
BOP's disciplinary procedures; they are subject to
summary reassignment to any other penal or correc-
tional facility within the system, cf. Meachum v. Fano,
427 U. S. 215, 224-229 (1976); and, being in the legal
custody of BOP, the Bureau has full discretion to control
many conditions of their confinement.  See Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U. S. 520, 544-548 (1979).
  It may seem unwise policy to treat defendants differ-
ently for purposes of sentence credit under 3585(b)
when they are similarly situated in fact-the one is
confined to a community treatment center after having
been -detained- and committed to the Bureau's custody,
while the other is -released- to such a center on bail.
But the alternative construction adopted by the Court of
Appeals in this case has its own grave difficulties.  To
determine in each case whether a defendant -released-
on bail was subjected to -jail-type confinement- would
require a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of
confinement, an inquiry based on information in the
hands of private entities not available to the Bureau as
a matter of right.  Even were such information more
readily available, it seems certain that the phrase -jail-
type confinement- would remain sufficiently vague and
amorphous so that much the same kind of disparity in
treatment for similarly situated defendants would arise.
The Government's construction of 3585(b), on the other
hand, provides both it and the defendant with clear
notice of the consequences of a 3142 -release- or
-detention- order.
  Respondent finally suggests that the rule of lenity
requires adoption of the -jail-type confinement- test for
purposes of calculating credit under 3585(b) because
-there is a split of authority in the Circuits concerning
the reach of `official detention,'- Brief for Respondent 34,
n. 13, and because there is ambiguity as to which forms
of custody fall within the meaning of -`official deten-
tion.'-  See id., at 34.  Respondent misconstrues the
doctrine.  A statute is not -`ambiguous' for purposes of
lenity merely because- there is -a division of judicial
authority- over its proper construction.  Moskal v.
United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990).  The rule of
lenity applies only if, -after seizing everything from
which aid can be derived,- Smith v. United States, 508
U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 16) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted), we can make -no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended.-  Ladner v.
United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958).  That is not
this case.
  We hold that the time respondent spent at the Volun-
teers of America community treatment center while
-released- on bail pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of
1984 was not -official detention- within the meaning of
18 U. S. C. 3585(b).  Respondent therefore was not
entitled to a credit against his sentence of imprisonment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
                                      It is so ordered.